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COURT-PACKING AND THE CHILD LABOR
AMENDMENT
Gerard N. Magliocca*
No amendment which any powerful economic interests or the
leaders of any powerful political party have had reason to
oppose has ever been ratified within anything like a reasonable
time. And thirteen states which contain only five percent of the
voting population can block ratification even though the thirtyfive States with ninety-five percent of the population are in
1
favor of it.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
We cannot take a stand consistently against the pending
proposal to pack the United States Supreme Court and at the
same time against the orderly amendment to the Federal
Constitution that is proposed by this amendment.2

Abbot Moffett, New York Assemblyman
On March 9, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
delivered a much-anticipated radio address to the nation
3
defending his proposal to “reorganize” the Supreme Court. In
that speech, FDR argued that the repeated invalidation of New
* Professor of Law, Indiana University—Indianapolis. Many thanks to Dan Cole,
Heidi Kitrosser, Mike Pitts, Richard Primus, the staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library in Hyde Park, NY, and the faculty at DePaul Law School for their assistance and
comments on prior versions of this Article.
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, A ‘Fireside Chat’ Discussing the Plan for Reorganization
of the Judiciary, in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 122, 131 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941) [hereinafter Fireside Chat].
2. W.A. Warn, Child Labor Bill Dies in Assembly; Vote Is 102 to 42, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1937, at 20 (describing the debate on the Child Labor Amendment to the
Federal Constitution by the New York Assembly).
3. For more on this Fireside Chat, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 326–27 (1998); JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168
DAYS 112–13 (1938); BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION: THE COURTPACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY 136–38 (2009); Turner Catledge,
Roosevelt Asks that Nation Trust Him in Court Move; Resents ‘Packing’ Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1937, at 1. The audio of the President’s address can be found at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/mediaplay.php?id=15381&admin=32.
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Deal statutes by the Justices meant that “we must take action to
4
save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.”
According to the President, this crisis could not be resolved by a
new constitutional amendment, in part because of the “long
course of ratification by three-fourths of all the States” required
5
by Article Five. The only solution was to “infuse new blood”
6
into the Court by adding many new Justices right away.
Just a few hours before FDR went on the airwaves, the New
York State Assembly rejected the Federal Child Labor
Amendment (CLA), which was passed by Congress in 1924 but
7
languished in the States during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1937,
however, half the States had ratified the CLA and its supporters
were optimistic about getting more to do so because they had
4. Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 126; see Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587, 609–10 (1936) (holding that the New York minimum wage law violated due
process); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68–72 (1936) (striking down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act for exceeding Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 367–68 (1935) (striking
down the Railroad Retirement Act for going beyond Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause); Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 125–26 (criticizing these decisions); see
generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT (2010) (providing an excellent account of what led to the Court-packing crisis).
5. Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 131; see U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the
requirement that an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of the States). FDR
also said that agreeing on the text of an amendment and garnering the two-thirds vote
necessary in each House of Congress would be too difficult. See id.
6. The President’s proposal would have created an extra seat on the Court for
every Justice over the age of seventy, and there were six Justices above that age at the
time. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (2009); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 134 (1995).
7. See Warn, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the vote); see also DAVID E. KYVIG,
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1776-1995, at
258–61 (1996) (describing the CLA’s failure to get traction); WALTER I. TRATTNER,
CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR
COMMITTEE AND CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 169–99 (1970) (discussing the
ratification fight from 1924 through the mid-1930s); Julie Novkov, Historicizing the
Figure of the Child in Legal Discourse: The Battle Over the Regulation of Child Labor, 44
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 369, 394–403 (2000) (providing more background); Richard B.
Sherman, The Rejection of the Child Labor Amendment, 45 MID-AMERICA 3 (1963)
(“The collapse of the ratification drive revealed a far deeper distrust of the federal
government and its efficacy as an instrument of reform than supporters of the
amendment had anticipated.”).
The CLA would have empowered Congress to limit, regulate, or prohibit the labor
of people under eighteen. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 436 n.1 (1939) (“Section
1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons
under eighteen years of age. Sec. 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this
article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary
to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress.”). The Fair Labor Standards Act
accomplished the same goal in 1938. See Sherman, supra, at 14; see also United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding the FLSA).
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the backing of a powerful patron—the President. Two months
prior to the New York vote, FDR wrote a letter to the governors
of the states that had not ratified the CLA and urged them to
9
make that one of their top priorities. He also waded into the
New York debate by sending public telegrams on behalf of the
10
Amendment, though his lobbying was obviously unsuccessful.
Thus, on March 10, readers of The New York Times were
greeted by a front-page with two banner headlines–one about
FDR’s appeal for Court-packing and the other on the failure of
11
the CLA in New York.

This Article explores the connection between the Child
Labor Amendment and FDR’s Court-packing plan.
Conventional wisdom says that the long fight to ratify the CLA
soured the President on the Article Five process and persuaded
12
him that challenging the Justices was the better option. The
truth is more complex. At the same time that the Administration
was arguing that the deadlock over the CLA demonstrated that
textual amendments were not a realistic way to achieve legal
change, FDR was putting on a full-court press for the ratification
8. For a complete history of the CLA ratification struggle, see Coleman, 307 U.S.
at 473 n.* (Butler, J., dissenting) (providing a chronology of state legislative action on the
Amendment).
9. Roosevelt Pleads on Child Labor Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1937, at 5; see also
Memorandum from Francis Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, to FDR (Dec. 28, 1936), at 1 (on file
with the FDR Presidential Library) (proposing that this letter be sent) [hereinafter
Perkins Memo].
10. Roosevelt Spurs Child Labor Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1937, at 12 (providing
the text of the telegram).
11. There is no evidence that the timing of these events was anything other than a
coincidence, though it does nicely encapsulate the broader point of this Article. The
Times headline is confusing in that it refers to the “Child Labor Bill” instead of the
“Child Labor Amendment.” There is no doubt, though, about what that story was talking
about.
12. See, e.g., LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 110 (“The President was especially
influenced by the tiresomely long, unsuccessful saga of attempting to win ratification for
the child-labor amendment, a struggle then in its thirteenth year.”).

!!MAGLIOCCA-272-CHILDLABORAMENDMENT3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

458

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/17/2011 9:53 AM

[Vol. 27:455

13

of that amendment. More perplexing still, the President made it
clear in his private letters during these weeks that he had no
14
faith in the ratification process. This raises an obvious
question—why did FDR put his authority behind the CLA?
While there is no smoking gun that describes the President’s
motives, the best explanation is that he supported the CLA
because he thought that it would fail and that highlighting that
failure would help the Court-packing plan. FDR’s foes in
Congress saw through this double-game and tried to expose his
real motives by backing a revised version of the CLA that would
have required state ratification conventions to vote on the
proposal within ninety days: an idea that would have undercut
15
the rationale for Court-packing. All of these maneuvers came
to an abrupt and inconclusive end, however, when the Justices
executed their “switch-in-time” a month after the President’s
16
address. Thus, the Child Labor Amendment ratification debate,
which reached its climax at about the same time that the Courtpacking plan was proposed and the Justices flipped, sheds new
light on that crucial series of events.
The most important takeaway from my story is that the view
that state ratification is a high hurdle for constitutional
amendments is an interpretation of Article Five that only
emerged in 1937. When Congress passed the CLA in 1924, the
prevailing consensus was that state legislatures were nothing but

13. For a sample of the Administration’s views on why the CLA’s failure supported
Court-packing, see President Roosevelt’s Plan for the Reorganization of the Federal
Judiciary: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 75th Cong. 14 (1937) (statement of
Attorney General Cummings) (on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (“The
phraseology of any proposed amendment would be the subject of endless debate and,
once submitted, might suffer the fate of the child labor amendment which has been
pending for thirteen years.”). The hearings on FDR’s Supreme Court proposal began one
day after the events described at the start of the text.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 105–109.
15. See Mr. Vandenberg’s Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1937, at 22 (describing
his proposal to reintroduce the CLA with modified language and require that it be voted
on by state ratification conventions within ninety days) [hereinafter Vandenberg]; id. (“If
Mr. VANDENBERG is correct in believing that Congress, in submitting an amendment
to State conventions, has the right to set the time for the calling of such conventions—
and many constitutional authorities believe that it has—then he is justified in declaring
that his amendment could be ‘ratified within ninety days’ if the full power of the
Administration were put behind it.”).
16. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1937) (upholding
the Wagner Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937)
(upholding a Washington state minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital); ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 144–47 (recounting the
switch-in-time); SOLOMON, supra note 3, at 156–61, 179–82 (same).
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17

a rubber stamp for amendments. By 1937, however, state
legislatures were viewed as a major obstacle. In part, this was
because of the difficulties that the CLA encountered in the
States. In part, though, this transformation was the product of
FDR’s deliberate effort to convince people, contrary to the
historical record, that state ratification of amendments was hard.
His argument on this point became an axiom in constitutional
practice even though his attempt to pack the Court failed.
Accordingly, we need to reconsider what the constitutional
crisis of 1937 was all about. When lawyers and historians reflect
on the Court-packing plan, they usually reach two conclusions.
First, the failure of FDR’s proposal fixed the number of justices
18
at nine for all time. Second, the Court learned that it could not
stand in the way of determined public opinion and must not
19
stray too far from the majority’s constitutional views. The CLA
debate adds a third leg to this stool. In the first three months of
1937, political elites and ordinary citizens were persuaded that
state legislatures could not be relied upon to ratify major
constitutional amendments. This presumption, which was
reinforced by the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) during the 1970s, is now so strong that the difficulty of
moving an Article Five amendment through the States is treated
20
as a fact.
Part One explores how the Article Five process was viewed
when the CLA was proposed and shows that most people
17. See 65 CONG. REC. 10,088 (1924) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“We know from
experience that State legislatures have rarely in recent years ever paused even to debate
a proposed constitutional amendment . . . . I do not mean to say that rule is universal, but
I do affirm it to be general.”); infra text accompanying notes 47–56 (discussing the effort
by CLA opponents to thwart the proposal by requiring that ratification be by
conventions rather than by legislatures).
18. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 315, 322 (1999) (“The number nine is fixed in our brains not so much as a
function of current legal awareness but as a number that has assumed the proportion of a
constitutional understanding. This understanding emerged from a time of crisis, the crisis
that President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan precipitated in 1937.”).
19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 4 (“In effect, a tacit deal was reached: the
American people would grant the justices their power, so long as the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution did not stray too far from what a majority of the
people believed it should be. For the most part, this deal has stuck.”).
20. Of course, one could say that neither the CLA nor the ERA failed in the sense
that their substance was eventually incorporated into statutory and case law, see David
A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457,
1475–78 (2001) (making this point), but with respect to the ERA that is a debatable
point. For a recent discussion about the relevance of the CLA’s failure for the debate
over originalism, see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the
Good Constitution, 98 GEO L.J. 1693, 1724–26 (2010).
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thought that ratification by state legislatures was easy. Part Two
examines why the CLA ran into a wall of opposition that
undermined this assumption about the role of state legislatures.
Part Three looks at how the close attention given to the CLA in
the first three months of 1937 influenced the debate on Courtpacking and transformed the meaning of Article Five.
I. THE GOLDEN AGE OF TEXTUAL AMENDMENTS
This Part traces how the States treated proposed
constitutional amendments until the passage of the CLA in 1924.
The evidence is clear that state legislatures almost always
ratified an amendment sent by Congress and did so quickly.
After all, four were approved in the decade prior to the proposal
21
on child labor. Indeed, the notion that state legislatures were an
insignificant barrier within Article Five was so widely accepted
that congressional enemies of the CLA made their stand by
proposing that state conventions rather than legislatures be
22
required to ratify the Amendment.
A. FROM THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE
A review of the historical record reveals that getting state
legislatures to endorse a textual amendment was not a problem
prior to 1924. In the midst of the Court-packing fight, a young
Republican congressman with a bright future, Everett Dirksen,
assembled data on this question to refute the President’s claim
that the states could not ratify amendments within a reasonable
23
time. Dirksen’s research showed that only one of the first
21. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 405–
28 (2005) (describing the constitutional amendments on the income tax, the direct
election of Senators, prohibition, and women’s suffrage).
22. See 65 CONG. REC. 7286 (1924) (stating the suggested change in the House of
Representatives as: “This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the conventions of the several States, as provided
in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof by
Congress”); id. at 10009 (making a similar proposal in the Senate that lacked the sevenyear time limit); cf. KYVIG, supra note 7, at 250 (“In the 1920s expressions of concern
about Article V tended to come not from those who feared that amendment was too
difficult but from those who worried that it was too easy.”).
23. See Time Factor in Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1937, at 54 [hereinafter
Time Factor]. The first ten amendments (as a group) took 810 days to receive approval
by three-fourths of the States, the Eleventh Amendment took 339 days, the Twelfth
Amendment 229 days, the Thirteen 309 days, the Fourteenth 756 days, the Fifteenth 356
days, the Sixteenth 1,278 days, the Seventeenth 359 days, the Eighteenth 396 days, the
Nineteenth 444 days, the Twentieth 327 days, and the Twenty-First 286 days. Id. While
there might be some minor errors in these figures, they are substantially correct and
confirm the broad point about the speed of state ratification.
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twenty-one amendments, the Sixteenth, took longer than three
24
years to ratify. The Supreme Court made a similar point in
25
Coleman v. Miller, which addressed the question of whether the
ratification process for the CLA was justiciable, when it said that
“one year, six months and thirteen days was the average time
used in passing upon amendments which have been ratified since
the first ten amendments . . . three years, six months and twenty26
five days has been the longest time used in ratifying.”
Not only were constitutional amendments prior to the 1920s
adopted rapidly, but there were only four passed by Congress
that were not ratified. Two were in the original proposal for the
Bill of Rights. One involved limits on congressional pay raises
and was eventually ratified—two hundred years later—as the
27
Twenty-Seventh Amendment. The other sought to regulate the
size of the House of Representatives and the number of
28
constituents that a member could represent. This proposal
29
came up one state shy of the total needed for ratification. Next
came the Anti-Title Amendment, which was passed by Congress
in 1810 and would have revoked the citizenship of anyone who
accepted a title from a foreign power or, without the consent of
30
31
Congress, a foreign gift. That also fell one state short. Finally,
24. Id. While the CLA was pending, the Twentieth and Twenty-First Amendments
were ratified in less than a year. Id. The Twenty-First, though, was ratified by
conventions. See infra text accompanying notes 88–91 (examining the logic behind this
exception).
25. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
26. Id. at 453; see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 372 (1921) (stating that prior to
the Eighteenth Amendment “seventeen of these [amendments] had been ratified by the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the states—some within a single year after their proposal
and all within four years”); ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 261–65 (discussing Coleman).
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of
Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J.
677, 678–81 (1993) (discussing that long-delayed ratification).
28. See 1 Stat. 97 (1789) (“After the first enumeration required by the first article of
the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the
number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by
Congress, that there shall not be less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than
one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of
Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so
regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor
more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.”); AMAR, supra note 21,
at 82 (discussing this proposal and noting that its goals were accomplished through
legislation).
29. See AMAR, supra note 21, at 82.
30. See Res. 2, 11th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 Stat. 613 (1810) (“If any citizen of the United
States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall,
without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office or

!!MAGLIOCCA-272-CHILDLABORAMENDMENT3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

462

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/17/2011 9:53 AM

[Vol. 27:455

there was the Corwin Amendment, which was passed by a lameduck Congress in 1861 as a last ditch effort to prevent secession
32
by providing permanent protection to slavery. With the onset of
33
the Civil War, that proposal never got off the ground. These
scattered instances of state legislative resistance to textual
amendments–all of which occurred long before the 1920s—do
not weaken the claim that state ratification was considered easy
before the passage of the CLA.
In any event, this remote history was far less relevant for the
Congress that proposed the CLA than the recent ratification of
the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments in quick succession. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
for example, told his colleagues that although he would vote for
the CLA he was “not at all in favor of the practice we have fallen
34
into of constantly amending the Constitution.” A House
member echoed this sentiment and said that amendments were
now “being proposed and falling as thick as ‘the autumn leaves
35
which strew the vales in Vallombrosa.’” In this context, an
argument that state legislatures constituted a bottleneck for
Article Five would have been met with incredulity.
B. CHILD LABOR AND THE CONVENTION POISON PILL
The Child Labor Amendment was proposed because of the
Supreme Court’s refusal to sanction ordinary legislative
36
measures taken to abolish the practice. In 1916, Congress
passed the Owen-Keating Act, which barred the interstate
shipment of goods made by children under the age of fourteen
emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king, prince or foreign power, such
person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding
any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them.”).
31. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 117.
32. See J. Res. 13, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 Stat. 251 (1861) (“No amendment shall
be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to
abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including
that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.”).
33. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 151 (noting that only three states ratified the
Corwin Amendment); see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 457 n* (pointing out that Illinois
ratified the amendment in an “irregular” manner).
34. 65 CONG. REC. 10,124 (1924) (statement of Sen. Lodge).
35. Id. at 7287 (statement of Rep. Garrett).
36. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 36, 44
(1922) (striking down a federal excise tax on the profits earned through child labor as
violating the Tenth Amendment); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918)
(voiding a federal statute that barred the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made
by child labor as exceeding Congress’s commerce clause power), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
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and those between fourteen and sixteen who worked more than
37
eight hours a day or forty hours per week. A constitutional
challenge reached the Court two years later in Hammer v.
38
Dagenhart, where five Justices held that the Act was beyond
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because the goods
themselves were harmless and the “production of articles,
intended for interstate commerce, is a matter of local
39
regulation.” The Court also held that “[t]here is no power
vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police
power so as to prevent possible unfair competition” stemming
40
from unequal labor laws. Justice Holmes dissented and argued
that when states “seek to send their products across the State
41
line they are no longer within their rights.” Besides, “if there is
any matter upon which civilized countries have agreed—far
more unanimously than they have with regard to intoxicants and
some other matters over which this country is now emotionally
42
aroused—it is the evil of premature and excessive child labor.”
Congress responded with the Child Labor Tax Law, which
imposed a ten-percent excise tax on the profits earned on the
same categories of goods that had been prohibited by the Owen43
Keating Act. The Court rejected this measure also, with Chief
Justice Taft reasoning that the “analogy to the Dagenhart Case
is clear” and that “[t]o give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would
be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers of
Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the
44
states.” As a result, the only course open to critics of child labor
was an Article Five amendment. It soon became clear that there
was broad support for an amendment, just as there had been for
45
the legislation attacking child labor. Even Calvin Coolidge,
46
hardly a progressive, endorsed the CLA.
37. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268 n.1 (quoting the Act); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at
127–31 (describing the debate on the Act); Novkov, supra note 7, at 373 (summarizing
the legislation).
38. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
39. Id. at 272.
40. Id. at 273.
41. Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. See Bailey, 259 U.S. at 34–35 (providing the text of the statute); TRATTNER,
supra note 7, at 139–40 (describing the tax); Novkov, supra note 7, at 373 (same).
44. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 39, 38.
45. See TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 128 (stating that the Owen-Keating Act passed
the House of Representatives by 343 to 46); id. at 131 (listing the Senate tally as 52 to
12); id. at 140 (stating the Senate vote on the child labor tax was 50 to 12 and the House
vote was 310 to 11). For more on the backdrop of the CLA in Congress, see Sherman,
supra note 7, at 4–7.
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Outnumbered foes of the Amendment tried to kill the
proposal by introducing a requirement that ratification in the
47
States be done by conventions and not by legislatures. The
thrust of their argument was that legislatures did not provide any
48
meaningful input into the deliberative process. As one
Congressman explained:
It is known to every student of American affairs that the
consideration of constitutional amendments by the several
legislatures has been in some if not many States almost
perfunctory. There has been little or no discussion of the
amendments by the several legislatures. There has been no
argument against argument, no judgment against judgment,
no real contest, and no real debate exciting interest or
49
contributing information.

Likewise, the Senator who introduced a convention
substitute there said the “facts show that the people elected to

I do not have a good explanation for why the CLA moved so easily through
Congress but ran into a buzz saw in the States. One possibility is that opponents of the
amendment did not get organized until the proposal reached the States. Congress could
also have been out of synch with the sentiments of the country on this issue, though I am
not sure why that would have been the case.
46. See Calvin Coolidge, Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1923), in 21 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1925, at 9350 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1925) (“For purposes of national uniformity we ought to provide, by
constitutional amendment and appropriate legislation, for a limitation of child labor.”).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. V (stating that constitutional amendments may be ratified
by state conventions or legislatures). There were substantive points made against the
CLA, but those are considered in Part II. See infra text accompanying notes 63–86.
48. Another concern was that voters ought to have a more direct say in the
ratification process. See 65 CONG. REC. 7287 (1924) (statement of Rep. Garrett) (“[A]s
conditions of law stand today, less than 3,000 individuals in the United States can amend
the organic law of the United States without there being in any way the slightest
opportunity for the masses of the people themselves to pass upon . . . such an
amendment.”) Some of this feeling stemmed from the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment in Ohio, where a referendum rejected Prohibition and, under state
constitutional law, nullified the legislative action. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 242–43
(describing this development). The Supreme Court held that this procedure was
inconsistent with Article Five. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920) (stating that
the method of ratification was expressly limited and “admits of no doubt in its
interpretation. It is not the function of courts or legislative bodies, national or state, to
alter the method which the Constitution has fixed.”). This decision left the impression (at
least for some people) that the ratification process was undemocratic. See KYVIG, supra
note 7, at 246 (quoting H.L. Mencken’s view that “free people, asked to give up their
ancient liberties, ought to have a fair chance to say yes or no, and not be rooked of them
by a process suggesting that whereby a three-card monte man operates upon the
husbandmen at a county fair”).
49. 65 CONG. REC. 7286 (1924) (statement of Rep. Montague); see id. at 10,074
(statement of Sen. Overman) (“Suppose this amendment shall be submitted now, will the
people have any voice in its ratification? No. It will be railroaded through the legislatures
which will meet next January . . . .”).
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the legislatures do not reflect the calm, considered judgment of
50
the people of the States.” Another Senator held that a
“member of a State legislature justifies himself in that attitude
by saying that both branches of Congress have already approved
the measure, and that he yields to their superior wisdom and
51
judgment, and, therefore, he does not pause to investigate.”
Supporters of the CLA dismissed these objections as a
52
transparent attempt to impede ratification. One Representative
said that every “gentleman in this House, whether he is for or
against this amendment, understands that the motive . . . at least
the result to be accomplished by the adoption of the proposed
53
amendment—would be to defeat any child labor law.” Others
could not understand how legislative ratification, which had
been used for every constitutional amendment up to that time,
54
could be problematic. When the votes were cast, the
55
convention alternative failed overwhelmingly. Both Houses

50. Id. at 10,009 (statement of Sen. Bayard). Some Senators also argued that many
of the recent amendments were passed in haste and would not have been ratified if
conventions were used. See id. at 10,074 (statement of Sen. Overman) (“I am pledged
never again to vote for a constitutional amendment unless it shall be submitted to the
people for their ratification. We all know the history of the adoption of the fourteenth,
fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth amendments. We know that in their
ratification the people were not consulted; we know that that the voice of the people
could not be heard . . . .”); id. at 10,009 (statement of Sen. Bayard) (“Had any one of
these matters, from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendment up, been sent to
the several States for ratification by conventions, I question if the thirteenth, fourteenth,
or fifteenth amendments would have been ratified. . . . I question very much whether the
eighteenth and nineteenth would . . . .”).
51. Id. at 10,088 (statement of Sen. Reed).
52. Cf. KYVIG, supra note 7, at 267 (“More than a touch of irony could be found in
evolving attitudes about constitutional amendment during the 1920s. Conservatives came
to argue that an amendment’s validation required direct popular participation in its
approval. Meanwhile, progressive reformers, usually the advocates of participatory
democracy, grew leery of its application to the amendment process.”).
53. 65 CONG. REC. at 7286 (statement of Rep. Foster); see id. (“That must be the
purpose and desire of any person, in my judgment, advocating the adoption of this
amendment. Otherwise, why should we abandon the ratification by State legislatures and
place it in the conventions?”); see also id. at 10,109 (statement of Sen. Walsh) (stating
that the convention substitute was designed “to put another obstacle in the way of this
reform which the Congress of the United States has twice indorsed and the House of
Representatives has now three times indorsed, each time by an overwhelming vote”).
54. See id. at 10,010 (statement of Sen. Robinson) (“[I]f the convention plan is such
a good one and so thoroughly calculated, as the Senator states, to reflect the popular will,
and the legislature plan is such a bad one and so calculated to reflect the contrary of the
popular will, why the people have never insisted upon having ratifications through
conventions but have always acquiesced in ratifications through State legislatures.”).
55. See id. at 10,141 (stating that the vote was 22 to 58 in the Senate); id. at 7289
(stating that the vote was 84 to 175 in the House).

!!MAGLIOCCA-272-CHILDLABORAMENDMENT3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

466

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

10/17/2011 9:53 AM

[Vol. 27:455

then passed the CLA by more than the two-thirds necessary
56
under Article Five.
The reason that this procedural debate is so fascinating is
that less than fifteen years later the opposite argument was
made. State legislatures became the bogeyman of constitutional
reform and those trying to block the President’s Court-packing
plan maintained that conventions were the best way to expedite
57
ratification. The CLA’s rough ride through the States partly
explains that turnaround.
II. THE RATIFICATION DEBATE IN THE STATES
This Part examines the arguments made against the CLA
58
that stymied its ratification from 1924 until 1937. Critics of the
proposed Amendment were particularly concerned about its
effect on parochial schools, the threat posed to parental rights by
subjecting childhood to federal authority, and the fear that
expressly authorizing Congress to regulate labor would be the
59
first step toward communism. While these charges stopped the
CLA in its tracks, they did not change the view that legislatures
were the best way of ratifying amendments.
A. SUBSTANTIVE ATTACKS AND HYPERBOLE
Though Arkansas ratified the CLA a few weeks after the
congressional vote, only five more states did so over the next six
60
years. Even worse for anti-child labor activists was that more
than twenty legislatures rejected the proposal in the 1920s, which
56. See id. at 10,142 (listing the final tally as 61 to 23); id. at 7295 (listing the vote as
297 to 69 in the House).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 133–141.
58. I will not dwell on the arguments in favor of banning child labor, as they are not
that hard to understand today. See 65 CONG. REC. 7168 (1924) (statement of Rep.
Nelson) (“The Constitution of America is the world’s greatest charter of human
emancipation. It was written by American men to protect man’s right to life, liberty, and
happiness; it is now also the instrument for the enfranchisement of American women;
and it shall be the refuge of freedom for American children from every form of child
slavery forever.”); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 165 (quoting Herbert Hoover’s endorsement
of the CLA because child labor was “a blight . . . more deplorable than war”).
59. Cf. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 261
(1941) (“In the effort to use language broad enough so that judicial construction could
not again mutilate it, a sweeping authority to the Federal Government was proposed. Its
breadth aroused the apprehensions of many people, some of whom had no sympathy
with the Court’s disposition of the Child Labor cases. But because of these
apprehensions it made slow progress towards ratification.”).
60. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 261 (explaining that three states ratified the CLA
between 1925 and 1930); Sherman, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that only Arkansas,
Arizona, and California had ratified the CLA in January 1925).

!!MAGLIOCCA-272-CHILDLABORAMENDMENT3.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

CHILD LABOR AMENDMENT

10/17/2011 9:53 AM

467

meant that more than the one-quarter total that could veto an
61
Article Five amendment was on record as saying no. This
lopsided result was the product of a strange coalition that
included the Catholic Church, white southerners, the textile
industry, and farmers, who probably agreed on nothing other
62
than their animus toward the CLA.
One leader of the campaign against ratification, especially
in Massachusetts and New York, was the Catholic Church, which
feared that the Amendment would let Congress regulate
63
parochial schools. Catholics argued that education was
implicated by the proposal since federal authority over “labor”
could be read to cover the mental labor of students in the
64
classroom. This was not an idle threat, as Oregon had passed an
65
initiative in 1922 banning parochial schools. The Court
invalidated this law in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy

61. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 260 (stating that “one or both houses of twenty-one
state legislatures had rejected the amendment”). Kansas rejected the CLA in 1925, and
that Legislature’s attempt to overturn this result in 1937 was the main issue in Coleman.
See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435–36 (1939); see id. at 447–50 (concluding that
Congress could recognize a state ratification even though there had been a prior
rejection).
62. See Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1010 (2002) (explaining that the CLA
“fell victim in the ratification phase to a conservative network including the Sentinels of
the Republic, the Woman Patriots, the National Association of Manufacturers, the
American Farm Bureau Federation, and a small number of prominent religious
leaders”).
63. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns The Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1062 (1992) (“Mainstream Catholics
viewed the Amendment with alarm, believing it posed a danger to parochial education
and transferred to the state powers that ought to belong to parents.”); see also
TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 176 (“[T]he opposition of the Catholic Church in
Massachusetts was a telling blow.”); id. (describing Catholic criticism of the CLA in
Massachusetts and New York due to the threat “to the Church’s prerogatives, especially
in the field of education.”).
64. See Letter from Charles F. Hurley, Gov. of Massachusetts, to FDR (Feb. 3,
1937), at 2 (on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (“Education might conceivably
fall within the scope of their authority, since “Labor” means any mental or physical
exertion.”) [hereinafter Hurley Letter]; Warn on Child Labor Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
1937, at 5 (discussing the “[f]ear that adoption of the Federal Child Labor Amendment
might lead to abolition of Roman Catholic parochial schools”); see also TRATTNER,
supra note 7, at 171–72 (stating that “Roman Catholics and some Lutherans” worried
about the CLA “since the dictionary definition of labor was ‘physical or mental toll’”) cf.
KYVIG, supra note 7, at 259 (quoting the resolution of the Georgia Legislature, which
rejected the CLA saying that it would give Congress “all state authority over
education”).
65. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 530–32 (1925) (describing the law and the constitutional challenge by a Catholic
school); Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 1017 (noting that the Ku Klux Klan was
instrumental in the passage of the Oregon plan).
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66

Names of Jesus and Mary, but that case was still pending when
67
many states (including Massachusetts) considered the CLA.
Even after Pierce was decided, the proposal still disturbed
Catholics because it could be construed as allowing Congress to
68
enact the same kind of sweeping prohibition.
A related line of attack, which came mostly from
conservative groups such as the Sentinels of the Republic, was
69
that the CLA was a dangerous invasion of parental authority.
One state representative said that in recent years “[t]hey have
taken our women away from us by constitutional amendment,
they have taken our liquor away from us; and now they want to
70
take our children.” In part, this argument stemmed from the
assumption that the wages of child workers (and therefore the
decision about whether they should work) belonged to their
71
parents. The more emotional appeals against the CLA raised
66. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); id. at 534 (holding that “the right to conduct schools was
property and that parents and guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the
education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places”).
67. Massachusetts, for example, held a non-binding referendum on the CLA in
November 1924 that resulted in a landslide against the proposal. See TRATTNER, supra
note 7, at 176. Pierce was not decided until 1925.
68. CLA supporters responded that there were no cases equating labor with
education, therefore the concern about school autonomy was unwarranted. See, e.g., Text
of Gov. Lehman’s Appeal for Child Labor Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1937, at 4
(“For centuries we have had laws dealing with both subjects, yet nobody has mixed them
up. Our law books are filled with decisions holding to the contrary and stating that labor
means physical toll, not the process of acquiring an education.”) [hereinafter Lehman
Appeal].
69. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 7174 (1924) (statement of Rep. Crisp) (“[T]his
proposed amendment goes further, in my judgment, than any amendment that has ever
been proposed to the Constitution so far as the control of human rights is concerned—
the God-given, inalienable right of parents to regulate and control their own children
whom God gave them.”); id. at 10,097 (statement of Sen. Ransdell) (“Just as soon as the
children are large enough to be of some assistance to their real parents they must be
delivered to their statutory father in Washington.”); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 258–59
(describing the Sentinels of the Republic as an organization that “looked back unhappily
at every amendment from the Fourteenth onward”); Novkov, supra note 7, at 399–400
(quoting an anti-CLA radio address in Massachusetts that asked “Christian mothers”
whether they could “afford to gamble with your children’s happiness at stake? Can you
afford to risk contamination of the Massachusetts home?”); Sherman, supra note 7, at 8
(stating that a common charge against the CLA was that “[p]arental control of children
would be surrendered to the bureaucracy”).
70. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 171; see Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 1065
(quoting the Columbia University President’s view that “[n]o American mother would
favor the adoption of an amendment that would empower Congress to invade the rights
of parents and to shape family life to its liking”).
71. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 63, at 1064 (“Children who received pay
envelopes were expected to turn them over to the parent unopened.”). As with parochial
education, the issue of parental rights was a live one during the 1920s. See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause protected the
right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
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the specter of a federal ban on household chores or the
72
involuntary removal of children from their parents.
Accordingly, critics often referred to the proposal as the “Youth
73
Control Amendment.”
Another powerful theme of the opposition was that the
CLA could be enforced only through very intrusive means,
74
which fed on the growing unpopularity of Prohibition. One
state representative captured this feeling by stating that
congressional power over child labor would “undoubtedly
necessitate the appointment of a horde of snooping,
meddlesome and tax-consuming investigators and officials
reminiscent of the odious activities of those employed to enforce
75
the Federal prohibition laws.” Most of the divisive civil liberties
cases during the 1920s involved alcohol, and thus the argument
that yet another amendment that expanded federal authority
76
could lead to a diminution of privacy was reasonable. More
72. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 259–60 (quoting a CLA supporter who said that
voters “had been told the most amazing things and were afraid the government was going
to step in and take their children from them, that children were to be prevented from
working in the home or on the farm, that no child under eighteen was to be allowed to do
any thing but school work, that parents were to be deprived of the authority over the
children, and much more of the same kind”); Sherman, supra note 7, at 11–12
(“[C]harges were circulated that even household chores would be forbidden if the
amendment were ratified.”); cf. Hurley Letter, supra note 64, at 2 (“It is not too fantastic
to visualize . . . compulsory military training, involuntary work on public projects, forced
attendance in concentration camps.”).
73. See Brief of Petitioners at 31, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (No. 7)
(quoting an ABA Journal article that referred to the CLA as the “Child Control
Amendment”); see also Lehman Appeal, supra note 68, at 4 (“It is also claimed that the
amendment seriously interferes with the home and with parental authority. . . . They call
it a ‘Youth Control Amendment.’”).
74. See, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 7, at 261 (“No doubt resistance to further
amendment was linked to the unhappiness with national prohibition that continued to
grow throughout the 1920s.”); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 170 (stating that an argument
against the CLA was that it “would mean an ominous increase of federal power, and an
extensive bureaucracy would arise to enforce the laws that would be enacted”).
75. Hurley Letter, supra note 64, at 3; see also 65 CONG. REC. 7195 (1924)
(statement of Rep. Hawes) (“[I]t will build up a great national bureau, with thousands of
police, called inspectors, who will intrude themselves into the homes, the schools, and the
private affairs of the citizens of our States.”); Warn, supra note 2, at 20 (“‘Governor
Lehman has said that Congress is composed of reasonable men. But what about the
Eighteenth Amendment and the Volsted Act?’” (quoting Charles McConnell, New York
Assemblyman)); cf. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 171 (“The prohibition (and, to some
extent, the woman suffrage) amendment altered the views of many regarding sumptuary
legislation and left widespread antagonism toward reformers and constitutional
change.”).
76. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (upholding the use of
wiretaps to enforce Prohibition against a Fourth Amendment challenge), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 276–77 (discussing
some examples); see generally Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence
of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY
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broadly, this unease about Prohibition energized those who
77
argued against the CLA on traditional federalism grounds.
Moving from the plane of principle to politics, the business
and agricultural interests that benefited from child labor were
78
also active in fighting the CLA. For instance, the textile
industry took a strong stand against anything that would deprive
79
them of the dainty hands that worked the power looms.
Newspaper publishers were critical of the proposal because
80
paperboys were a key link in the distribution chain. Farmers’
organizations fought the CLA because youth were essential for
81
the operation of family farms. And the Manufacturer’s Record,
a leading commercial trade journal, contended that the CLA
“would be the greatest thing ever done in America in behalf of
the activities of Hell. It would make millions of young people . . .
idlers in brain and body, and thus make them the devil’s best
82
workshop.” Of course, the CLA did not require the abolition of

L. REV. 1 (2006) (exploring this issue in depth).
77. The states’-rights criticism was weak given that the CLA said that state
regulation of child labor was not preempted. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 n.1
(1939) (quoting § 2 of the CLA, which stated “[t]he power of the several States is
unimpaired by this article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to
the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress”). But the issue
was still raised. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 309 (stating that the American Bar
Association “decried the amendment as an unwarranted federal invasion of the rights of
states and families”); Novkov, supra note 7, at 400 (stating that the best argument against
the CLA was that the “amendment would allow for improper federal control over the
authority of the states”).
78. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 7278 (1924) (statement of Rep. Perlman) (“Who are
opposed to this amendment? In the main those who wish to exploit children for their
own profit.”); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 173 (“The National Association of
Manufacturers made defeat of the amendment its major item of business for 1924.”);
Novkov, supra note 7, at 402 (“[T]he image of the American icon of the yeoman farmer
subjected to federal control was meant to frighten potential amendment supporters.”).
79. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 258 (explaining that textile manufacturers mounted
the successful court challenges in Dagenhart and Bailey and played an important role in
opposing the CLA); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 174 (noting that one of the leading
agrarian lobbies against the CLA was “actually headed by the cashier of a cotton mill
bank in North Carolina; [and] its vice-president was an employee of a cotton mill store”).
80. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 258 (“Newspaper publishers, employers of young
boys for sales and delivery, joined in the attack.”).
81. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 11 (“[A]grarian hostility to the child labor
amendment was substantial. A large proportion of the working children ages ten to
fifteen were engaged in agricultural pursuits. Although statutory regulation of such labor
was not then proposed by supporters of the amendment, many farmers were certainly
apprehensive that such interference would be forthcoming.” (footnote omitted));
Browning Opposes the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1937, at 5 (quoting the Tennessee
Governor, who opposed the CLA because he was “not ready to turn over to a
Washington bureau the discrimination as to whether a farmer can have his boy help him
make a crop”).
82. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 173.
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any form of child labor—the text only authorized Congress to do
83
so—but that point was often lost in the heat of the debate.
Finally, there was the claim that the CLA was just part of a
84
communist plot to destroy America. The official publication of
the Boston archdiocese argued during the debate in
Massachusetts that the Amendment was “more in keeping with
Soviet Russia than with the fundamental principles of the
85
American Government.” In New York, a state representative
stated that “I do not accuse all of those who favor this
amendment of being Communists or Socialists merely because
all Communists and Socialists favor it, but I do claim that far
beyond the innocent and plausible purpose of many sincere
86
people there is definitely sinister purpose . . . .” These
outrageous charges probably got a sympathetic hearing because
of the recent establishment of the Soviet Union and the fear
created by the Russian Revolution.

83. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435 n.1 (1939) (“The Congress shall have
power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.”);
cf. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 169 (quoting The New Republic’s view that “[t]he friends
of the amendment were totally unprepared to combat the flood of distorted propaganda
which let loose upon them. They had been accustomed to argue [sic] their case before
reasonable and attentive human beings. They suddenly found themselves compelled to
discuss a matter of public policy with a monstrous jazz band”).
84. See, e.g., 65 CONG. REC. 9963 (1924) (quoting the petition of the Woman Patriot
Publishing Co., which asserted that the CLA “is a straight Socialist measure. It is also
promoted under direct orders from Moscow”); Novkov, supra note 7, at 399 (“[Critics]
appealed to fears of communism and socialism by portraying the amendment as merely a
first step in a sinister plan to establish complete state control . . . .”); Sherman, supra note
7, at 9 (“[R]ed-scare tactics were widely used to condemn the child labor amendment as
un-American, and there is no doubt that this approach was an important factor in its
defeat.”).
85. Sherman, supra note 7, at 13; see 65 CONG. REC. 10,088 (1924) (statement of
Sen. Reed) (“People are advocating this measure who have advocated everything
socialistic and destructive; people are advocating this measure who have been going to
school literally to those doctrinaires of Russia, who think that the child is the ward of the
state; that it should be taken from its mother’s arms and put under the tutelage and
supervision of state officials.”).
86. Warn, supra note 2, at 20 (quoting Laurens M. Hamilton); see also TRATTNER,
supra note 7, at 172 (“Opponents of child labor reform deliberately aroused these
feelings, stigmatizing the amendment as a subversive movement spawned by the Russian
Revolution, thus adding another dimension to the arguments against it.”); Warn, supra
note 2, at 20 (“‘Those who favor the present amendment will not realize that in seeking
to free children from one form of slavery they may well be delivering those same children
and generations yet unborn to the same kind of controlled, regimented legal slavery that
children in other parts of the world are subjected to.’” (quoting Laurens M. Hamilton,
New York State Assemblyman).
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B. THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTS
Notwithstanding the inability of state legislatures to ratify
the CLA, when Congress proposed two new constitutional
amendments in the early 1930s there was no sign that the debate
had changed any minds about Article Five. The Twentieth
Amendment, which revised the start of the presidential and
congressional terms and presidential selection procedures under
unusual conditions, was sent to the States in the traditional way
87
in 1932 and ratified in less than a year. The Twenty-First
Amendment was passed in 1933 with a requirement that state
conventions ratify the repeal of Prohibition, but that was a
88
special exception unconnected to the CLA.
Anti-Prohibitionists argued that the convention route was
necessary because too many state legislatures were skewed in
favor of the “dry” faction and would not vote for repeal. The
Wickersham Commission, which conducted a thorough review of
Prohibition for President Hoover, concluded that the ratification
of the Eighteenth Amendment was the result of malapportioned
legislatures that over-represented rural voters who were more
89
likely to support a ban on alcohol. Oddly enough, this
confirmed the argument made by the critics of the CLA who
claimed that state legislatures did not provide an adequate check
90
on Article Five. Three of the commissioners took the position
that Congress should submit any repeal of Prohibition for
ratification by state conventions to bypass the opposition in the

87. See U.S. CONST. amend XX; KYVIG, supra note 7, at 274 (observing that the
Twentieth Amendment was passed by Congress in March 1932 and ratified in January
1933). This Amendment made four changes. First, the presidential and vice-presidential
inauguration was moved to January 20th. See id. at § 1. Second, the start of the
congressional session was moved up to January 3rd. See id. at § 2. Third, new procedures
were established for what would happen if the President-elect died or was deemed
ineligible prior to the inauguration. See id. § 3. Finally, procedures were established for
what would happen if a candidate for President or Vice-President died in an election
where no candidate received a majority of the electoral vote. See id. at § 4. For a
discussion of these provisions, see AMAR, supra note 21, at 428–30.
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (“The eighteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.”); id. at § 3 (requiring ratification
by state conventions).
89. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 277–78 (describing the Wickersham Report); see
also AMAR, supra note 21, at 416 (“State and congressional apportionment rules in the
1910s had tended to favor rural and heavily native-born regions.); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that equal protection challenge to malapportioned state
legislatures did not constitute a nonjusticiable political question).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. There is no indication that state
legislative districting skewed the outcome with respect to the CLA or any other
constitutional amendment.
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91

state legislatures. The Democratic National Convention
adopted this proposal as a platform plank in 1932, and Congress
92
acted upon that recommendation a year later.
While the Twenty-First Amendment was seen as a
significant precedent during the Court-packing debate, the
convention method was used in 1933 because Prohibition was
considered a unique case where the procedural choice made a
93
substantive difference. There is no indication in the legislative
history or in any other sources that the obstacles encountered by
the CLA were a factor in that decision. And the ratification of
the Twentieth Amendment confirms that there was no general
change in attitude about the role of state legislatures even
though the CLA had been pending for nine years at that point. It
would take the guile and rhetoric of one of our greatest
presidents to alter the understanding of Article Five.
III. THE MISSING STORY OF THE 1937 CRISIS
This Part discusses the previously unknown link between
the CLA and the Court-packing plan from December 1936 until
March 29, 1937, when the country learned of Justice Owen
94
Roberts’ switch-in-time in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.
With the onset of the Great Depression, support for prohibiting
child labor increased as a way to increase wages, and half of the
95
States had ratified the Amendment by the beginning of 1937.
At that point, the President gave the CLA a strong endorsement.
But appearances were deceiving. The inability of the States to
ratify the Amendment, which FDR emphasized through his
high-profile support, turned into one of his leading arguments
for Court-packing. In the process, the CLA’s rough ride through

91. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 278; see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 416
(“[M]alapportionment lived on in many states, prompting Anti-Prohibitionists to
sidestep state legislatures altogether in the ratification process.”).
92. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 280–86 (summarizing the debate and the rapid
ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment by the state conventions).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 131–139.
94. 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (upholding the Washington minimum wage statute
and overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital); ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 144
(stating that this case “was the great moment”); SOLOMON, supra note 3, at 159–62
(discussing contemporary reactions to Justice Roberts’ about-face).
95. Luther A. Huston, Child Labor Amendment Hope Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
1937, at 65 (noting that Kentucky ratified the CLA earlier in the week, making it the
twenty-fifth state to do so); see also Novkov, supra note 7, at 395 (“A second and larger
wave of ratifications began in 1933 and ran through 1937, reflecting a new concern with
child labor borne of the Depression.”).
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state legislatures became the operative precedent under Article
Five.
A. PROBING FDR’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOTIVES
Let us begin by examining how the President got behind the
CLA and why his action should be viewed with some skepticism.
Following FDR’s overwhelming reelection, the Secretary of
Labor, Francis Perkins, sent him a memo contending that “[t]he
immediate outlook for ratification of the child labor amendment
is encouraging but definite impetus by you is necessary to turn
the scale. A letter from you to the incoming Governors of the
States that have not ratified, which will have regular sessions in
96
1937 would be immensely valuable.” FDR agreed and wrote
that letter to great fanfare on January 8, 1937:
I am sure you will agree with me that one of the most
encouraging developments of the past few years is the general
agreement that has been reached that child labor should be
permanently abolished.
...
However, it is clearly indicated that child labor, especially in
low-paid, unstandardized types of work, is increasing. I am
convinced that nation-wide minimum standards are necessary
and that a way should be found promptly to crystallize in legal
safeguards public opinion in behalf of the elimination of child
labor.
Do you not agree with me that ratification of the child-labor
amendment by the remaining twelve States whose action is
necessary to place it in the Constitution is the obvious way to
early achievement of our objective? I hope that you will agree
that this can be made one of the major items in the legislative
97
program of your State this year.

The White House was definitely interested in this issue, as I
found a handwritten note of unknown authorship in FDR’s files

96. Perkins Memo, supra note 9, at 1; see Letter from Frances Perkins, Sec. of
Labor, to Marvin H. McIntyre, Ass’t Sec’y to the President (Dec. 26, 1936) (on file with
the FDR Presidential Library) (“I talked with the President after Cabinet meeting about
sending this letter to the Governors of the 19 States which have not yet ratified the Child
Labor Amendment. He said that he would like to do it, and asked me to prepare what I
thought would be a suitable letter.”).
97. Roosevelt Pleads on Child Labor Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1937, at 5; see id.
(“Many observers believe that the President’s plea will achieve the object, despite the
stormy debates that have been waged on the subject of child labor.”).
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listing all of the governors who received the letter and noting
98
their replies.
All of this looks straightforward enough, but the timing of
FDR’s intervention is curious because prior to 1937 he did not
lift a finger to help the CLA. At a 1935 press conference, the
President made his indifference clear:
Q: It seems there is anti-child labor organization complaining
that you are exerting influence with state legislatures to have
that amendment ratified?
THE PRESIDENT: Not exerting influence. I made my
position very clear a year ago and I have stuck to that.
Q:And that is?
THE PRESIDENT: No change. I am in favor of it but I am
99
exerting no influence.

His hands-off approach is partly explained by the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which essentially suspended
antitrust law and promoted cooperative practices within
100
industries. These codes made great strides in reducing child

98. See FDR Official File 58-A (“Letters Sent to Governors and Gov. Elect of
following states—re Child Labor Amendment”) (on file with the FDR Presidential
Library); Press Conference No. 339, in 9 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 108 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1937) (“Q: Have you heard from
the nineteen Governors who wrote in regard to the child labor amendment? THE
PRESIDENT: I think we have replies from every one of them and from the smaller states
the information I get is that it looks pretty favorable.”).
99. Press Conference No. 182, in 5 COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS
CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 102–03 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1935). My
search through the presidential archives in Hyde Park confirms that FDR was doing
nothing to aid the CLA before 1937. He received many requests from CLA supporters
for the kind of strong endorsement that he provided in 1937, see Letter of Courtney
Dinwiddie, General Sec’y of the National Child Labor Committee, to FDR (Oct. 3, 1934)
(on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (“Strong backing of the Amendment by the
Administration, as the method for perpetuating the child labor gains, would, we are
confident, insure success. If you agree, may we hope for your active support of the
Amendment?”), but these requests were ignored or met with tepid statements. And
when Francis Perkins drafted congratulatory telegrams for FDR to send to Indiana and
Idaho upon their ratification of the CLA in 1935, the President told his aide to “forget
about these.” See Memorandum of Francis Perkins, Sec’y of Labor, to Marvin McIntyre
(Feb. 9, 1935) (on file with the FDR Presidential Library) (including her draft telegrams
with a negative cover note attributed to FDR).
100. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, at 200 (“The NIRA attempted to deal with the
problem of economic collapse by permitting businesses in different economic sectors to
enter into cooperative codes of fair competition, which also were to include provisions
for collective bargaining for wages and hours.”); TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 190
(“Passed in June 1933 . . . the NIRA sought to end cutthroat competition by promoting
cooperative action among trade groups, to raise prices by limiting production, and to
guarantee labor a reasonable work week and decent wages.”).
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labor and led the President to say in the 1934 State of the Union
101
that the practice was “abolished.” Nevertheless, when the
Court struck down the Act in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
102
103
United States, FDR did not change his posture on the CLA.
The shift to a pro-amendment stance came only in 1937, which
begs the question—why then?
Furthermore, the President’s open support of the CLA is
hard to reconcile with his private correspondence during the
same period, which shows nothing but disdain for the Article
104
Five process. For instance, just six weeks after his endorsement
of the Amendment, he told a friend that no “controversial
amendment, especially one which in effect is opposed by a
political party, has ever been passed within a short space of
105
time.” FDR told Felix Frankfurter (then a member of the
Harvard faculty) at about the same time that if he was “without
a conscience, I would gladly undertake for a drawing account of
fifteen or twenty million dollars (easy enough to raise) to
guarantee that an amendment would not be ratified . . . . In other
106
words, I think I could prevent ratification in thirteen states.”
Finally, he confided to his White House Press Secretary that
ratification of any amendment was unlikely since it was easy “for
moneyed interests to buy up enough legislatures to prevent
107
action.”
The most revealing comment came in a letter to Charles C.
Burlingham in which FDR explained why he was pursuing
101. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 196; see id. at 190–95 (discussing the impact of these
codes on child labor); Letter from FDR to Courtenay Dinwiddie, National Child Labor
Committee (Nov. 8, 1934) (on file with FDR Presidential Library) (“One of the
accomplishments under the National Recovery Act which has given me the greatest
gratification is the outlawing of child labor.”).
102. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
103. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 308 (explaining that Schechter “rendered child labor
restrictions, along with the other features of the codes, unenforceable”); TRATTNER,
supra note 7, at 200 (stating that “the child employment curve shot upward again” after
Schechter).
104. The President’s public comments were also inconsistent with his stated position
on the CLA, as just one day before his letter he told Congress in his State of the Union
that “there is little fault to be found with the Constitution of the United States as it
stands today. The vital need is not an alteration of our fundamental law, but an
increasingly enlightened view with reference to it.” KYVIG, supra note 7, at 302.
105. Letter from FDR to Arthur F. Mullen (Feb. 25, 1937) (on file with the FDR
Presidential Library).
106. KYVIG, supra note 7, at 303 (quoting a letter from FDR to Frankfurter dated
February 9, 1937).
107. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 111 (quoting a diary entry recording a
conversation between Press Secretary Early and Raymond Clopper); see also id. at 282
n.100 (stating that this entry was dated February 8, 1937).
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Court-packing instead of a constitutional amendment to secure
the New Deal. He told Burlingham that “[i]f you were not as
scrupulous and ethical as you happen to be, you could make five
million dollars as easy as rolling off a log by undertaking a
campaign to prevent the ratification by one house of the
Legislature, or even the summoning of a constitutional
convention in thirteen states for the next four years. Easy
108
money.” This was illuminating because Burlingham was the
head of the Nonpartisan Committee for Ratification of the
109
Federal Child Labor Amendment! In effect, FDR was saying
that the whole project was a waste of time. If the President
believed that and felt free to express that view in private to one
of the CLA’s chief supporters, then why did he back the
Amendment in public?
One explanation for the strange timing and for the
inconsistency behind FDR’s support of the CLA is that in
January 1937 he was secretly preparing the Court-packing
110
plan. Attorney General Homer Cummings was the only
Cabinet member aware of the President’s scheme, and the
proposal was put together with the help of only a few Justice
111
Department attorneys until its release on February 5th. A
connection between the Court-packing plan and the President’s
intensified support of the CLA is suggested by the fact, discussed
in the next section, that the Administration used the failure of
the state ratification process as a significant argument for judicial
112
reform. Ironically, Herbert Hoover was the first person to see
this link when he joined FDR’s call for the ratification of the
CLA because it was “important that we have orderly

108. Letter from FDR to Charles C. Burlingham (Feb. 23, 1937) (on file with the
FDR Presidential Library), at 1.
109. Dr. Butler Fights Child Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1937, at 2.
110. For some background on the President’s thinking about Court-packing, see
ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 22–37 (discussing his deliberations after the 1936
presidential election); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 82–131 (reaching back even
further into FDR’s first term).
111. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 43 (“At the White House the President
nursed his delightful secret, while Homer Cummings and the serious, hard-working
Solicitor General, Stanley Reed, labored over their papers and law books at the Justice
Department. Only one man was allowed to help them—Cummings’ personal assistant,
Alexander Holtzoff . . . .”); SOLOMON, supra note 3, at 93 (“Night after night during the
following weeks, Homer Cummings used a secluded entrance into the White House to
confer with the president and then slip away unseen.”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6,
at 217 (stating that the plan was announced in a Cabinet meeting on February 5, 1937).
112. See infra text accompanying notes 119–128.
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constitutional change instead of pressure on the independence of
113
the Supreme Court.”
The critical difference between Hoover and the White
House must have rested with their respective assessments of the
likelihood that the CLA would be ratified. After all, Hoover’s
view was right with the assumption that the proposal would be
adopted by three-fourths of the States. The ratification of an
Article Five amendment would undercut the argument that
constitutional change could be achieved only by enlarging the
Court. This makes FDR’s support of the CLA even more
inexplicable, especially since just one day before he introduced
the Court-packing proposal he sent a public telegram urging the
114
New York Legislature to ratify the CLA.
The fog surrounding the President’s actions disappears if we
assume that he was sure the CLA would not be ratified. In that
case, backing the Amendment would not harm the Court plan.
Instead, it would reinforce the argument that Article Five was
obsolete. There was a robust expectation in February, created
115
partly by FDR’s public appeal, that the CLA would be ratified.
Indeed, the opinion polls (crude as they were at the time)
demonstrated that the proposal was favored by seventy-six
percent of voters and commanded a majority in every single
116
state. Failure of the ratification process in light of this
widespread support would make it clear that the constitutional
will of the nation could not be expressed through standard
means. This is what the President was counting on because he

113. Hoover Supports Roosevelt in an Appeal for Early Ratification of Child Labor
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1937, at 6; see supra text accompanying note 2 (making the
same connection in the debate on the CLA in the New York Legislature).
114. See Roosevelt Spurs Child Labor Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1937, at 12 (“I want
all friends and supporters of the Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution to know
that my attitude toward this measure to protect the rights of childhood has not changed.
Only last month I wrote a letter to the Governors of nineteen States asking that
ratification of the amendment be made one of the major items in the legislative program
in their States this year. I sincerely hope that my own State will be among those to
ratify.”).
115. See Huston, supra note 95, at 65 (“[S]upporters of the amendment and
observers of the legislative trends feel that the assertion that 1937 may be the year in
which the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution will join other historic
changes in the basic law, is not without foundation.”); see also Child Labor Ban Gains
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1937, at 68 (stating that the CLA “is increasingly
debated” and “seems destined at last for approval by the Legislature” in New York).
116. TRATTNER, supra note 7, at 201–02 (describing this poll); see also Letter from
John Tibby, Associate Editor of the American Institute of Public Opinion to Stephen
Early, Assistant Secretary to FDR (Jan. 12, 1937) (providing a poll that showed majority
support for the CLA in forty-five of the forty-eight states).
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117

wanted the Court-packing plan to get through Congress.
Though there is no direct evidence in FDR’s papers that spells
out his thinking on this point, no other explanation is
118
convincing.
The most plausible alternative theory is that the President’s
support of the CLA was an independent fallback position in case
his effort to pack the Court failed, but this interpretation is not
supported by the facts. First, FDR’s lack of interest in the CLA
prior to 1937 works against the view that it was not connected to
his confrontation with the Justices. Second, he did not express
support for any other proposed constitutional amendment in
1937. If pursuing reform through Article Five were a realistic
option, one would think that the President would have at least
taken an interest in some of the textual amendments that were
being discussed in Congress. Third, the logical time for pushing
the CLA as Plan B would have been after the defeat of the
Court scheme, not while it was under consideration. The more
closely one looks at the issue, the more clear it becomes that
FDR was simply using the CLA as a stalking horse for Courtpacking.
B. ARTICLE THREE OR ARTICLE FIVE?
Further proof for the hypothesis that the President used the
CLA as a political lever can be found in his acts following the
announcement of the Court-packing plan. The White House
launched a coordinated campaign to sell the message that the
CLA’s failure in the state legislatures showed that Article Five
could not be relied upon to overcome the Supreme Court’s
119
resistance to the New Deal. At the same time, however, FDR

117. Since Francis Perkins was unaware of the Court-packing plan when she wrote
her memo to FDR, see supra text accompanying note 96, her support for the CLA must
be taken as genuine.
118. See infra text accompanying note 135 (describing Republican claims that FDR
was not truly interested in the ratification of the CLA).
119. See Map a Farm Drive to Push Court Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1937, at 35
(quoting Senator Pope of Idaho, who said that “Is it not certain that most of those who
are bitterly opposed to the President’s proposal would also be opposed to any
amendment to enlarge the powers of Congress to enact social legislation? The same
influences that have so long delayed the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment will
be active in delaying, if not defeating, any other such constitutional amendment.”); Time
Factor, supra note 23, at 54 (“[T]hose favoring court reform by statute are prepared to
cite the thirteen-year retardation of the proposed Child Labor Amendment as an
example of the time involved in driving an amendment through three-fourths of the
forty-eight States. They are ready to say that the course of this proposed addition to the
charter proves conclusively what can be done when power is applied to opposition.”).
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continued to express his support for the Amendment. What is
often overlooked is that while the country was debating the
Court’s future in February and March 1937, the CLA was under
active consideration in the States, and there was a feedback loop
between the two issues that operated in the President’s favor
until Congress launched a surprise initiative at the end of
121
March.
For example, the leading spokesman for the
Administration’s plan was Attorney General Cummings, and on
February 15 he gave a national radio address that explained why
the CLA experience was an argument in favor of Court-packing:
Those who are violently opposing the President’s
recommendations insist the reforms he seeks to bring about
should be accomplished by amending the Constitution and by
that method alone. This is the strategy of delay and the last
resort of those who desire to prevent the adoption of any
Constitutional amendment. The child labor amendment,
122
submitted thirteen years ago, has not yet been ratified.

Just one week later, though, Cummings spoke on behalf of
the CLA in hearings held by the New York Assembly:
The vital problem of child labor can best be solved by nationwide action. The amendment would clearly empower the
Congress to deal with the matter. The suggestion advanced by
certain opponents of the amendment that it may result in
prohibiting children to help their parents at home or on the
farm is not entitled to a moment’s consideration. It is a mere
device to distract attention from the merits of the amendment
123
itself.”

120. See Telegram from Taylor E. Julien to FDR (Feb. 8, 1937) (on file with the
FDR Presidential Library) (asking the President whether the CLA should be supported
vigorously with a cover note from FDR stating “Write him today and say ‘Yes.’”); see
also Memorandum from F.H. LaGuardia, Mayor of New York to FDR (Mar, 27, 1937)
(reporting on the Maryland Legislature’s consideration of the CLA at the request of the
White House).
121. See Child Amendment Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1937, at 3 (stating that New
Mexico ratified the CLA but was rejected by South Dakota); see also Ratified by 28th
State, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1937, at 6 (noting the ratification by Kansas). For more on the
national debate about Court-packing, see ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 317–33; ALSOP &
CATLEDGE, supra note 3, at 63–134; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 132–42. The New
York Times headline of March 10, 1937 was a rather vivid representation of this link. See
supra text accompanying notes 11–12.
122. Address by Homer Cummings, Att’y Gen. of the United States (NBC, CBS, and
Mutual Broadcasting radio broadcast Feb 15. 1937). The Attorney General said the same
thing to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See supra note 13.
123. W.A. Warn, Roosevelt Makes Child Labor Plea to the Assembly, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1937, at 1; see id. (“Advocates and opponents of ratification voiced their pleas
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The President added to these mixed signals by sending yet
another telegram to New York on the same day urging
124
ratification.
This brings us back to the Fireside Chat of March 9, in
which he gave a detailed defense of the Court-packing plan and
125
put a new spin on the state ratification process. In that speech,
FDR said that “[n]o amendment which any powerful economic
interests or the leaders of any powerful political party have had
reason to oppose has ever been ratified within anything like a
reasonable time” and he observed that thirteen states with just
126
five percent of the population could veto any proposal. There
is no doubt that this passage referred to the CLA, as no other
127
With this
amendment supported the President’s claim.
statement, he was pulling a bait-and-switch by asking voters to
see a current event (the fight over the CLA) as emblematic of
Article Five. That effort was made possible by FDR’s cagey
decision to make the public more aware of the CLA through his
endorsement. What is remarkable is that the President’s rhetoric
was so powerful that modern lawyers simply accept without
question that what he said is true.
The substance of the Fireside Chat and FDR’s political
sense was vindicated in the following three weeks as the CLA
ran out of gas. Not only did New York reject the proposal
shortly before the President’s speech, but Connecticut,
128
Massachusetts, and Nebraska also voted no in March. At that
for more than six hours in an atmosphere of high tension rarely paralleled at a legislative
hearing. The Assembly chamber and galleries were filled. Not in a generation had a
hearing on a legislative measure attracted so large a throng.”).
124. Id. (“I am informed that the Child Labor Amendment will come up for
discussion today at a public hearing before the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly.
The bill having passed the Senate, I sincerely trust that the House will take similar
favorable action as quickly as possible. I hope very much that my own home State will be
prompt in ratification.”).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 3–6.
126. Fireside Chat, supra note 1, at 131.
127. Time Factor, supra note 23, at 54 (“Advocacy of an amendment is, the
administration says through Mr. Cummings, the last resort of those objecting to anything
new, and indeed is utterly impractical because of the tedious and uncertain ratification
process. But this is met with statements that on the average only about fifteen and onethird months were necessary for the State sanction of the last eleven changes in the
supreme law of the land. Seven of these eleven amendments were ratified by threefourths of the States in less than one year.”); see also KYVIG, supra note 7, at 304 (“The
president made no mention of recent episodes that suggested otherwise about the time
needed to achieve an amendment. The lame duck and prohibition repeal amendments of
1933 did less to stir confidence than the thwarted child labor amendment did to provoke
contrary expectations.”).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 7–11; see also Connecticut Bars Child
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point, “[e]ven the most ardent backers of the proposal conceded
that it was highly improbable that it would be written into the
129
Constitution this year.” Opponents of the Court-packing plan
in Congress, however, were about to upset the President’s
calculations.
Three days after FDR’s Fireside Chat, The New York Times
ran an editorial entitled “Child Labor: What Now?” that
130
described the state of play with respect to the CLA. After
stating that “[n]othing can disguise the fact that the action of the
New York Assembly is a serious setback for the child labor
amendment,” the Times contended that Congress should draft a
new CLA and “follow the precedent of prohibition repeal, not to
131
the Legislatures but to ‘conventions’ of the States.” Citing
recent public opinion polls, the editorial stated that it was
132
“extremely probable” that such a proposal would be ratified.
On March 27, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a Republican
from Michigan, followed up on this suggestion and introduced a
133
revised CLA with a convention requirement. The Senator
stated that if the Administration got behind his idea the CLA
134
could be ratified within ninety days. Savvy political strategists,
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1937, at 3 (discussing the CLA’s defeat by the
Connecticut state house); Child Labor Curb Doomed This Year, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1937, at 13 (“The Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution, approved by
only four States in 1937, appeared today to have slight prospect of full ratification this
year . . . .”); Ban on Child Labor Suffers New Blow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1937, at 4
(discussing the rejection of the CLA by the Nebraska Legislature) [hereinafter New
Blow]; To End Child Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1937, at 20 (noting the no vote in
Massachusetts) [hereinafter End Child Labor].
129. New Blow, supra note 128, at 4.
130. Child Labor: What Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1937, at 22 [hereinafter What
Now?].
131. Id.; End Child Labor, supra note 128, at 20 (“The new amendment, following
the precedent of prohibition repeal, should be submitted to ‘conventions’ and not to the
Legislatures of the States. This is the way, and at present it is the only way, of submitting
the proposal directly to the people; and there seems to be little doubt that they would
overwhelmingly approve it.”).
132. See What Now?, supra note 130, at 22 (stating that eighty-three percent of
voters supported the CLA in New York despite its rejection by the Assembly); id. (“As
the delegates to such conventions have no other function than to vote for or against the
amendment, the popular vote electing delegates is virtually a direct referendum on the
question.”).
133. Vandenberg Gives a New Amendment to Ban Child Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1937, at 18 [hereinafter New Amendment]. His proposal also contained some revised text
that allowed Congress to “limit and prohibit” child labor but not to “regulate” the
practice, defined the object of the authority as “labor for hire” and not “labor,” and
lowered the age from eighteen to sixteen. See Vandenberg, supra note 15, at 22.
134. See Vandenberg, supra note 15, at 22; see also Louis Stark, New National Labor
Laws Pondered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1937, at 70 (“A storm of opposition to the
Vandenberg resolution is already brewing among the proponents of the pending
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however, understood that FDR would never embrace the
Vandenberg Amendment because a real prospect of ratification
would kill the Court plan:
Some Republican observers expressed the belief that it would
not be considered good strategy by President Roosevelt and
his advisers to push for immediate ratification of a child labor
amendment because the failure of the necessary thirty-six
States to ratify the pending amendment is one of the most
telling arguments used by proponents of the President’s court
plan against counter-proposals to accomplish the end which
135
he has in view by means of a constitutional amendment.

While Vandenberg’s intent is just as obscure as the President’s, it
is doubtful that he brought forward a new CLA just because he
liked kids. After all, the Senator was a leading critic of Courtpacking and was busy organizing a bipartisan coalition to oppose
136
the President. It would have been an amazing coincidence if
the new amendment were proposed for reasons that were
completely unconnected to the Court fight, just as it is hard to
believe that FDR suddenly took an interest in the CLA in
137
January without an ulterior motive.
The Vandenberg Amendment contains several remarkable
features that merit discussion. First, the new-and-improved CLA
was a brilliant attempt to outflank the President. If he supported
the proposal and it was ratified quickly, that would be
devastating to his argument that Article Five was now an
anachronism. If he opposed the idea, then that would open FDR
amendment; it is being held in check only by the preoccupation of Congress with the
President’s judiciary reform program. The Senator from Michigan, however, has
promised to press his plan at the first opportunity. He says he is certain that his proposed
amendment could be ratified by thirty-six States in ninety days.”).
135. New Amendment, supra note 133, at 1. Granted, there were others who took the
President at his word that he wanted the CLA ratified. See Vandenberg, supra note 15, at
22 (“It has been suggested that the President might refuse to support a new amendment
of this sort on the ground that the long delay in approval of the old child labor
amendment has been the chief argument against referring the proposal to enlarge the
court directly to the people in the form of a constitutional amendment. But it is
inconceivable that the President, of all people, would do anything to prolong the
exploitation of children for one day simply in the hope of scoring a political point.”).
136. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 6, at 140 (describing Senator Vandenberg’s
planning on how to oppose the President); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 332
(stating that Vandenberg gave a national radio address on March 2 attacking the Courtpacking proposal).
137. The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the Vandenberg Amendment in
June, New Child Labor Amendment Put to Senate; Committee Is Unanimous for 16-Year
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22, 1937, at 1, but the proposal never reached the floor because
by then abolishing child labor by statute was the preferred solution. See infra text
accompanying notes 142–145.
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to charges of hypocrisy given his prior support for the CLA.
Second, the Twenty-First Amendment precedent, which was
based on the unique problems posed by “dry” state legislatures
139
and their malapportionment, now assumed greater importance.
A plausible counterfactual exists in which the principal result
that emerged from the Court fight (assuming that the switch-intime did not happen) was that all future amendments should be
ratified by state conventions and that this was the preferred
140
method for transforming the law.
Most important, the Vandenberg Amendment confirmed
that the constitutional culture that framed Congress’s
deliberations on the original CLA was gone. In 1924, state
conventions were viewed as the way to slow down the Article
141
Five bandwagon. Now they were seen as the only way to
expedite ratification and salvage. The perspective on state
legislatures, of course, flipped around the other way. Part of this
was attributable to the CLA’s difficulties, but prior to 1937 most
lawyers did not attach any significance to them. FDR succeeded
in changing that through his campaign for Court-packing, and
the Vandenberg Amendment consolidated that shift by
accepting his assertion that the CLA was representative rather
than exceptional. Constitutional law would never be the same.
C. THE SWITCH-IN-TIME AND COLEMAN V. MILLER
Two days after Senator Vandenberg opened his
counterattack against the President’s position on the CLA,
Justice Roberts changed his position on the New Deal in West
142
Coast Hotel. Lawyers realized almost immediately that this
meant that a statute banning child labor could now be
143
sustained. Just a week after the switch, The New York Times
138. Granted, the textual differences between the Vandenberg Amendment and the
original CLA might have provided the President with the excuse he needed to conduct
his own switch-in-time if necessary.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 88–94.
140. This was not the only moment when the New Deal could have been thrown in a
radically different direction. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the Guarantee
Clause, 83 TULANE L. REV. 1 (2008) (explaining how Senator Long’s assassination in
1935 aborted an effort to use the Guarantee Clause to articulate the principles of the
emerging constitutional regime).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 47–56.
142. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (upholding
the Washington minimum wage statute and overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital).
143. In the days immediately preceding West Coast Hotel, there were some
suggestions that a law challenging Hammer v. Dagenhart should be enacted as an
alternative to the CLA. See End Child Labor, supra note 128, at 20 (“Even while the new
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noted that “[e]vents of the last few days stimulated activity at
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue as well as in administrative
circles generally on the problems of minimum wages and child
144
labor.” Within a month, the bill that became the Fair Labor
Standards Act was being drafted and interest in the CLA
145
vanished as child labor was abolished by statute.
The Court finally got involved in the CLA debate in 1939,
but the opinions in Coleman obscured the significance of the
146
ratification debate. Chief Justice Hughes’ majority opinion
held, among other things, that only Congress could place a time
limit on the ratification of a constitutional amendment and that
there was no indication that such a limit was contemplated for
147
the CLA. But the Justices said nothing about the difficulty of
getting an amendment ratified by the States and treated the
amendment process as if it were unaffected by the Courtpacking fight. Indeed, Justice Robert H. Jackson later said that
Coleman was important because if it had come out the other way
“the precedent thus created would have placed serious
148
restrictions upon the amending process for all time to come.”
The elected branches, however, established the real restrictions
on Article Five in 1937 by persuading the country that state

amendment is pending, they may find it possible, in the words of the President, to take
action—now! This is the purpose of the bill just introduced by Senator WHEELER
which . . . would make the products of child labor subject to the laws of the State into
which they are shipped.”); id. (“What opponents of child labor need to keep principally
in mind is that they are not necessarily confronted by an ‘either-or’ course.”).
144. Stark, supra note 134, at 70.
145. See The President’s Position, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1937, at 66 (“[R]ecent
decisions of the Supreme Court offer reasonable hope that the problem of child labor can
be dealt with satisfactorily without either an amendment of the Constitution or a forced
change in the membership of the court itself.”); see also The Wheeler-Johnson Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 1937, at 24 (“A child labor amendment is itself still desirable. But it does
not seem wise to reject three-quarters of a loaf now on the ground that it may injure
one’s chances of getting a whole loaf perhaps several years hence.”). No states ratified
the CLA after the switch-in-time.
146. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, passim (1939). The Court did mention that the
President issued a letter in support of the CLA, but that was the only comment on the
events described in the text. See id. at 451 n.28.
147. See id. at 451–54. The constitutionality of the FLSA was unclear at this point,
thus a ruling that the CLA was no longer valid would have looked ominous. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 262 (“Congress had acted as if it were confident that the
Court would no longer defend cases like Hammer and would allow statutory action
without the need for further constitutional amendment. But if the Court had upheld the
Kansans’ complaint, it would be placing this assumption, and hence the Fair Labor
Standards Act, under a cloud.”).
148. JACKSON, supra note 59, at 261.
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legislatures were the place where constitutional amendments go
149
to die.
CONCLUSION
Textual changes to the Constitution did not end with the
150
defeat of the Child Labor Amendment. What did end was the
premise that getting these proposals ratified by state legislatures
151
would be easy. The President’s plan to make the CLA into the
poster child for the amendment process was successful even
though its object—supporting Court-packing—was not. The
failure of the ERA in the 1970s reinforced this notion and
turned the futility of state ratification into a truism, to the point
that today nobody is seriously pursuing constitutional change
through Article Five.
By showing that the current construction of Article Five is
just that—a construction rather than a fact—this Article seeks to
provoke a new discussion about the merits of using the
constitutional amendment process. While there are circumstances where agreeing on a textual formula for legal change or
moving that language through Congress may not be the best
course of action, the assumption that federalism is an
insurmountable obstacle to reform should be reexamined.

149. Justice Jackson also accepted this argument. See id. (“The difficulty of
amending the Constitution to make sure that it says what it already was intended to say
was illustrated by the fate of the proposed amendment.”).
150. The Twenty-Second Amendment took four years to ratify, which was the
longest period for any successful proposal at that time. See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 327–
31 (discussing the amendment’s passage by Congress); see also AMAR, supra note 21, at
433 (stating that ratification occurred in 1951); supra text accompanying note 24 (stating
that the Sixteenth Amendment took almost as long to ratify). By contrast, the four
amendments ratified in the 1960s and 1970s were rapidly adopted by the States. See
KYVIG, supra note 7, at 355–56 (stating that the Twenty-Third Amendment was ratified
in less than ten months); see also AMAR, supra note 21, at 442 (stating that the TwentyFourth Amendment was ratified in two years); id. at 445 (stating that the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment was ratified in just four months); id. at 449 (stating that the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment was ratified in less than two years).
151. The proposed constitutional amendment to permit Congress to ban flag burning
might constitute an exception, in the sense that one could say that the states would ratify
such a proposal in no time flat if they were given the chance. There is no way to know,
though, unless that amendment receives the necessary support in the Senate and in the
House of Representatives.

